**Practice Advisory**

**Reviving “Extortion Plus”:**

**An Alternative Paradigm for Analyzing Mexican Asylum Claims**

by Carlos Spector[[1]](#footnote-1)

 Nearly ever immigration lawyer with some knowledge of asylum law and practice is aware of the extraordinarily high rejection rate of Mexican claims in immigration courts nationwide.[[2]](#footnote-2)Mexican asylum-seekers have almost uniformly presented applications based on their government’s inability or unwillingness to protect them from organized criminal groups and the violence they spawn. Nearly every application cites to the egregious abuses perpetrated by these groups as well as the power that they exert throughout the country. Nonetheless, the serious harm that the applicant has experienced or fears experiencing, often involving some sort of extortion, is generally deemed to be mere criminal activity instead of the persecution required by the asylum provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[[3]](#footnote-3) As a result, the granting of asylum to Mexicans in general, and to victims of extortion in particular, is rare and unusual.

In July 2013, however, an Immigration Judge in El Paso, Texas granted withholding of removal[[4]](#footnote-4) to Christian Chaidez, a thirty-two-year-old native of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, based on the assassination of eleven of his family members who had refused to pay extortion to criminal groups.[[5]](#footnote-5) Mr. Chaidez’s success in Immigration Court offers some home and is an important reminder that Mexican asylum claims should not be written off. Instead, this victory underscores the need to revisit the way that immigration practitioners and adjudicators alike understand violence in Mexico.

This Practice Advisory proposes an alternative paradigm for analyzing asylum cases in a manner that clearly places many of the claims brought by Mexican nationals squarely within the limits of existing United States asylum law. In that way, it is intended as a guide for immigration practitioners interested in challenging the prevailing narrative used to explain persecution in Mexico. By drawing upon the idea of “extortion plus,” and considering the concepts of authorized crime, dual sovereignty, and symbolic violence, this article provides a framework through which the merits of Mexican asylum claims can be duly appreciated.

***“Extortion Plus”***

 The concept of “extortion plus” was introduced in 1997 in a dissenting opinion to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board or BIA) decision in [*Matter of T-M-B-*, 21 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1997)](https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1997145171&pubNum=0001650&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Keycite)). In that case, the respondent feared returned to the Philippines where members of the guerilla group the New People’s Army (NPA) had attempted to recruit her and had demanded her payment of “revolutionary taxes.” When she refused, she was beaten and threatened at gunpoint, causing her to begin to make payments to the group despite her own disapproval of their activities. The majority of the Board found that her interactions with the NPA were “consistent with” the nonpolitical end of extorting money for their cause and, considering country conditions, found that the harm the respondent had endured could reasonably be construed as being for reasons other than her political opinion. Based on that analysis, the majority of the Board found that the respondent had failed to show that she had been persecuted on account of her political opinion and, in turn, that she had failed to demonstrate her eligibility for asylum.

Former Board Members Lori Rosenberg and Paul Schmidt dissented from the Board’s decision in *Matter of T-M-B-*, indicating instead that they would have granted asylum to the applicant. More specifically, Board Member Rosenberg reasoned that the case was an example of what she called “extortion plus,” insofar as the evidence established that the respondent’s persecution was motivated by something more than the desire for continued payments. Indeed, according to Board Member Rosenberg, the respondent’s explicit statement of her political opposition to the group and her disapproval of their methods and goals created a context in which their extortion reflected in part their desire to overcome this belief or characteristic through punishment.

 The majority’s decision in *Matter of T-M-B-*, provided grounds for the Board and immigration judges to deny asylum applications where the respondent described having been extorted by his or her persecutors. CITE. However, Board Member Rosenberg’s dissent was not in vain. Indeed, in reviewing the Board’s decision in *Matter of T-M-B-*, the Ninth Circuit adopted Board Member Rosenberg’s reasoning and applied the analysis of “extortion plus” to many cases in its jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit’s decision on review, *Borja v. INS*, 175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999), was also consistent with its prior decisions in *Gonzales-Neyra v. INS*, 122 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1997)[[6]](#footnote-6) and *Desir v. Ilchert*, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988). In *Gonzales-Neyra*, the Peruvian Shining Path initially targeted the respondent for extortion because he was a successful businessman. When he refused to comply with their demands, citing his disapproval with their revolutionary politics, he was threatened with death. Although the immigration judge and Board denied the respondent’s claim by relying on the economic motivation for the extortion demands, the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that

“…the fact that the guerrillas may have initially chosen Gonzales-Neyra as a target for money because he was a successful businessman, does not relate to their subsequent motivationfor persecuting him. The persecution of which Gonzales-Neyra complains is not the extortion, but the threats upon his life and business that were made after the guerrillas learned of his political orientation.”

[*Gonzales-Neyra*, 122 F.3dat](https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1997145171&pubNum=0001650&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Keycite)#co_pp_sp_1650_777) 1296. Similarly, in *Desir*, the Board rejected the asylum claim of a Haitian national who had been arrested, threatened, and assaulted by the Ton Ton Macoutes as a result of his failure to pay bribes for fishing privileges. On review, the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the respondent’s “refusal to accede to extortion in a political system founded on extortion resulted in his classification and treatment as a subversive.” *Desir*, 840 F.2d at 727. Given this standing precedent in the Ninth Circuit, when faced with review of *Matter of T-M-B-*,the panel embraced the concept of “extortion plus” and, in issuing *Borja*, reversed the Board’s decision. The panel concluded that the nexus requirement only demanded the production of evidence “from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or implied protected ground.” *Borja*, 175 F.3d at 735-36.

 The passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005, however, brought significant changes to the analysis of so-called “mixed-motive” cases, where the alleged persecutor had multiple possible reasons for persecuting the applicant. Pursuant to the statutory changes, an applicant for asylum must now demonstrate that his or her protected characteristic was or would be “at least one central reason” for the persecution.[[7]](#footnote-7) According to the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decisions, the REAL ID Act superseded *Borja* and now, even in the Ninth Circuit, an applicant must show that the protected ground was a necessary cause of the persecutory conduct. *See Parussimova v. Mukasey*, 533 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2008), *as amended*, 555 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2008).

 While things may not be ideal for extortion victims seeking asylum in this post-REAL ID Act context, the effect of that legislation does not eliminate the utility of a paradigm based on the concept of “extortion plus.” Indeed, the REAL ID Act has done nothing to disturb the underlying reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in *Gonzales-Neyra* or in *Desir*. As a result, the REAL ID Act should not prevent the granting of relief to applicants in the Ninth Circuit who may have been targeted with extortion for economic reasons, but who are threatened or even harmed more seriously only after their political opinions are disclosed. *See generally*, *Gonzales-Neyra*, 122 F.3d at 1296. In the same way, *Desir* enables victims of extortion to succeed in their claims for asylum in the Ninth Circuit if country conditions are such that a refusal to pay extortion demands may be regarded as political. *See generally*, *Desir*, 840 F.2d at 727.

These lines of reasoning, which remain valid in the Ninth Circuit and could be adopted in other circuits as well, are part of the concept of “extortion plus.” The revival of this interpretive mechanism would allow for due consideration to be given to the specific circumstances of a Mexican extortion victim as well as to the political context in Mexico. As Board Member Rosenberg’s analysis in *Matter of T-M-B-* makes clear, “extortion plus” views the initial economic motivations of extortion as but one factor in the determination of whether refusal to pay extortion demands constitutes political opinion. In the case of Christian Chaidez mentioned above, the Immigration Judge did not stop at the economic motivations of the persecutors when analyzing whether the respondent had demonstrated that he was targeted on account of his political opinion. Instead, he considered that eleven of Mr. Chaidez’s family members had been assassinated for refusing to pay extortion and that seven of those family members were killed on one single day. After a careful analysis of the facts and of the implications of refusal to pay extortion to this group, the Immigration Judge concluded that Mr. Chaidez had demonstrated that he was at risk on account of his political opinion and granted him relief.

This type of “extortion plus” analysis is fully consistent with the REAL ID Act, which requires simply that an applicant show a causal relationship between a protected ground and the persecution endured or feared, but which does not require the applicant to show that the protected ground was the only reasonable cause of the persecution. However, adoption of this concept is hindered by an overly simplistic understanding of organized criminal groups in Mexico and their relationship with the Mexican government. As a result, any advocacy or reasoning that seeks to challenge this dominant legal and political narrative must also rely on theories of authorized crime, dual sovereignty, and symbolic violence.

***“Authorized Crime”***

 Most immigration adjudicators, and perhaps many members of the public, as well, understand the political context in Mexico as one in which rogue criminal groups are responsible for the increasing incidence of extortion, kidnappings, and homicides and in which Mexican law enforcement officials are taking all reasonable steps to eliminate such criminal violence. This understanding makes it extremely difficult for victims of Mexican criminal groups to demonstrate that their resistance to those groups was a form of political opinion. However, a more accurate characterization of the growing violence can be found in the concept of “authorized crime,”[[8]](#footnote-8) which posits that such criminal activity in Mexico cannot occur or indeed flourish without the complicity of municipal, state, or federal authority.

 The application of the term “authorized crime” to the Mexican context is supported by significant documentation of the relationship between criminal groups and the government. The statistical evidence of widespread corruption and impunity is startling. According to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI by its Spanish name, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía), just 1.8 percent of the homicides registered in 2012 have resulted in a sentence.[[9]](#footnote-9) Sentences have been issued in just 523 of the 27,500 homicides registered in Mexico last year, according to INEGI. In regions where the cartels are dominant, such impunity is even higher. In San Luis Potosi, 99.6 percent of homicide cases have not been resolved. In Sinaloa, the number is 99.2 percent, with 98.3 percent in Chihuahua, 97.5 percent in Tamaulipas, and 96.8 percent in Michoacan. Further evidence of the cartels’ free reign is found in the fact that only thirty percent of those detained on drug trafficking charges between 2007 and 2011 were convicted. CITATION. The United Nations has said that ninety percent of those arrested during the first five years of President Felipe Calderon’s administration eventually went free. CITATION.

By providing a way to challenge the narrative in which criminal groups operate entirely separately from the Mexican authorities, the concept of “authorized crime” can serve as a useful guiding principle in the handling of asylum claims where the violent actions of those groups might otherwise be regarded as simply criminal.

***“Dual Sovereignty”***

 In their book *The Executioner’s Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State they Created*, authors George Grayson and Samuel Logan, respectively a professor and a journalist, describe the situation in Mexico as one of “dual sovereignty.” They rely on the 1938 work of Harvard historian Cane Briton who described the concept as follows:

“When another and conflicting chain of institutions provides another and conflicting set of decisions, then you have a dual sovereignty. Within the same society, two sets of institutions, leaders, and laws demand obedience, not in one single respect, but in the whole interwoven series of actions which make up life for the average man.”

Grayson and Logan recognize that the term applies mostly to situations in which a group tries to assert independence from the statute, such as Darfur separatists in Sudan or Basque nationalists in Spain, and that organized criminal entities in Mexico have no apparent interest in securing independence of a particular Mexican territory. Nonetheless, charting the quasi-official functions played by criminal groups in Mexico, as reflected in Table 1, below, is strong evidence that Mexico is indeed an example of Briton’s “dual sovereignty.”

Although the concept of “dual sovereignty” is historical and sociological in nature, existing case law allows for its smooth application to asylum cases. Indeed, according Board precedent in *Matter of Linnas*, 19 I&N Dec. 302 (BIA 1985), the government of a country includes not only the formal institutions recognized as valid by the United States, but any “political organization that exercises power on behalf of the people subjected to its jurisdiction.” Accordingly, following *Linnas* and relying on the significant reporting documenting the authority of criminal organizations in Mexico, it would reasonable to describe those organizations as a form of government that coexist along with the official Mexican government in a form of “dual sovereignty.”

***“Symbolic Violence”***

 A criminal organization’s violent reaction to one’s refusal to pay extortion can be perceived as direct or circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s perception of the alien’s anticorruption beliefs. This is possible in the context of weak Mexican state institutions and a confrontational relationship with the state which compels Mexican traffickers to fight among each other for control of territory to traffic some drugs and extort local populations. Some scholars believe that “these organized crime groups have entered an equilibrium in which ‘symbolic violence’ has become a ‘cost effective mechanism of control of local populations and a language to signal dominance in territories where other drug trafficking organizations are present or considering encroachment.’”[[10]](#endnote-1) Moreover, the view exists that the violent mode of political control is by no means the exclusive purview of state agencies. In fact, researchers are concluding that “violent forms of control are becoming the norm in actions of criminal cartels in many places of the world.”[[11]](#footnote-10)

 The use of this “symbolic violence” by cartels to extort and exercise control over a family, organization and/ or community clearly has a political dimension that requires exploration in order to determine whether refusal to pay constitutes civil disobedience and therefore political opinion. This is especially true when hyper-violence such as multiple and/or brutal murders are publicized by cartels to send a message of domination and control.

***Applying the Framework: Resistance to Extortion as a Form of Political Opinion***

 According to Professor Amar Khoday, of the University of Manitoba in Canada, many individuals who resist participation in corruption do so as an expression of their political opinion towards such conduct. In an article reviewing Canadian asylum jurisprudence, Professor Khoday charts different forms of resistance to corruption in regards to their public visibility.[[12]](#footnote-11) At one end of the spectrum, he places individuals and groups who oppose corruption by blowing the whistle to the public, including through the organization of strikes or campaigns, or through the publishing of articles. This is the most visible expression of resistance to corruption and is nearly always regarded as a manifestation of political opinion. At the other end of the continuum of resistance, Professor Khoday places individuals who refuse to pay bribes and explicitly refuse to engage in acts of corruption. This manifestation of resistance, according to Professor Khoday, is the least publicly visible form. In between both ends of the spectrum are those individuals who go beyond refusing to carry out a corrupt act by reporting the activity to public officials. Although less visible than those who take to the streets or media to publicize corruption, the act of reporting renders the individual making the report more visible than if he had simply refused to comply with a corrupt act.

 Refusal or inability to pay extortion to either state actors and/or criminal organizations may, under certain circumstances, constitute the expression of political opinion. Courts have recognized that while “[p]urely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of political opinion,” it may be so considered “[w]hen the alleged [government] corruption [or extortion] is inextricably intertwined with governmental operation,” which is necessarily political. [Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2000)](https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2000068582&pubNum=506&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Keycite)). Similarly, [Desir](https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1988032563&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Keycite)) concluded that refusal to comply with the extortion demands of members of a governmental security force constitutes the expression of a political opinion where the refusal results in “classification and treatment as a subversive.” [Desir](https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1988032563&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Keycite)), 840 F.2d at 727. Nonetheless, most circuits have held that state actors’ retaliatory conduct for failure to pay bribes is generally driven by criminal, non-political motives. [Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 2004)](https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2004842587&pubNum=506&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Keycite)#co_pp_sp_506_793). *Thuri* interestingly enough favorably cites *Grava* and *Desir* but distinguishes the facts in its decision to conclude that the legal standards announced in these cases do not apply. *Id*.at 792-93. Similarly, [Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 2011)](https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2025133929&pubNum=506&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Keycite)) held that mere refusal to pay extortion demands does not constitute political opinion in the absence of evidence connecting criminal activity to political opinion.

***Conclusion***

Work in progress. Simply wanted to share in hopes of starting a necessary discussion concerning the state of Mexican asylum claims.

**Table 1: Elements of Dual Sovereignty**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Function** | **Elected Government** | **Narco Government/Cartels** |
| Leadership | Mayor or governor | Plaza chief |
| Security | Legally appointed police chief | Killers who work for plaza chiefs and may even wear uniforms that they make or steal from the army or federal, state, and local police |
| Collection of resources | Taxation | “War Taxes” or extortion |
| Prisons | Federal, state, and local | Control by Loz Zetas who exact bribes from other inmates |
| Economic activities | Economic development promoter | Creation of jobs for those growing and transporting drugs, as well as the employment of couriers, lookouts, a gunmen |
| Cultural affairs | Museums, art exhibitions, musical presentations | Sponsorship of *corridos* that extol the virtue of the capos; kill and/or intimidate singers who perform anti-Zeta ballads |
| Mass media | Director of communication and advertising in local newspapers, magazines, and electronic media | Narco-banners, presence on *YouTube*; a person called an *enlace* or “link” acts as a liaison between the media and the cartel. The organization also threatens to kill journalists who expose their activities, while bribing members of the Fourth Estate to cooperate with them through the *enlace* |
| Street propaganda | Mobilize support for government-supported events | Employ young people and street vendors to disseminate propaganda adverse to the Federal Police and armed forces |
| Judiciary | Selected by legal procedures | Corrupt and intimidate judges, and even hold their own tribunals and exact penalties, including capital punishment, on those whom they find guilty |
| Elections | Organized in accordance with state and federal electoral laws and supervised by appropriate electoral institutes | Provide resources to their favorite candidates, regardless of party affiliation, while intimidating backers of their foes; concentrate on municipal and state office holders who can facilitate their growing, importing, storing, and moving drugs through their established routes |
| Credentials | Issued by federal, state, and municipal governments | Los Zetas have produced a prodigious number of drivers’ licenses, voter credentials, travelers’ checks, “vales” for supermarkets, and other documents in Cuidad Valles, San Luis Potosí, in a printing facility the size of four basketball courts  |

**Table 2: Immigration Court Defensive Asylum Statistics Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela\* 2007-2012\*\***

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2007** | **Received** | **Granted** | **Denied** |
| **Mexico** | 3,133 | 49 (1.5%) | 288 (9%) |
| **Colombia** | 1,742 | 683 (39%) | 1,240 (71%) |
| **Venezuela** | 826 | 317 (38%) | 463 (56%) |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2008** | **Received** | **Granted** | **Denied** |
| **Mexico** | 3,698 | 73 (1.9%) | 249 (7%) |
| **Colombia** | 1,238 | 548 (44%) | 810 (65%) |
| **Venezuela** | 802 | 206 (26%) | 379 (47%) |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2009** | **Received** | **Granted** | **Denied** |
| **Mexico** | 3,698 | 65 (1.8%) | 364 (10%) |
| **Colombia** | 1,051 | 368 (35%) | 504 (48%) |
| **Venezuela** | 662 | 192 (29%) | 298 (45%) |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2010** | **Received** | **Granted** | **Denied** |
| **Mexico** | 4,510 | 49 (1.1%) | 509 (11%) |
| **Colombia** | 720 | 234 (33%) | 382 (53%) |
| **Venezuela** | 466 | 181 (39%) | 208 (45%) |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2011** | **Received** | **Granted** | **Denied** |
| **Mexico** | 6,133 | 104 (1.7%) | 1,073 (17%) |
| **Colombia** | 547 | 213 (39%) | 223 (41%) |
| **Venezuela** | 445 | 205 (46%) | 136 (31%) |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2012** | **Received** | **Granted** | **Denied** |
| **Mexico** | 9,206 | 126 (1%) | 9,080 (99%) |
| **Colombia** | 451 | 131 (29%) | 320 (71%) |
| **Venezuela** | 360 | 130 (36%) | 230 (64%) |

**\*Taken from U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology**

**\*\*Rounded to nearest percentage point**

1. Carlos Spector’s law firm in El Paso, Texas is devoted exclusively to the practice of immigration and nationality law. The majority of the cases he handles involve issues related to the immigration consequences of criminal convictions and asylum claims on behalf of those fleeing persecution in Mexico. In 1991, his advocacy resulted in one of the first defensive asylum claims by a Mexican national ever to be granted in the United States. In 2012, Mr. Spector led the founding of a community organization, *Mexicanos en Exilio* as a direct response to the politically motivated violence engendered by the “war on drugs.” He currently represents over seventy-five Mexican asylum applicants on a *pro bono* basis and has been successful in securing asylum for eight of his Mexican clients. Mr. Spector can be reached at spectorimm@yahoo.com. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See Table 2 below for comparative defensive asylum statistics, 2007-2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The INA authorizes the granting of asylum to those who fall within the statutory definition of a refugee. Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA defines a refugee as any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Although persecution is not expressly defined within the INA, case law directs that a threat to life or freedom on account of one of the five protected grounds is always persecution. *See Matter of Laipenieks*, 18 I&N Dec. 433 (BIA 1983). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Withholding of removal, as described at INA § 241(b)(3), is a formal of relief that is available to asylum applicants who are statutorily barred from that relief. As with asylum, it requires proof that the applicant has experienced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution in his home country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Alfredo Corchado, *In Rare Step, Immigration Court Considers Extortion as a Factor in Political Asylum Case*,The Dallas Mornings News, July 9, 2013, www.dallasnews.com/news/nationworld/mexico/201307

09-in-rare-step-immigration-court-considers-extortion-as-a-factor-in-political-asylum-case.ece?nclick\_check=1. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The Ninth Circuit amended this decision at 133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *See* INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Noé Zavaleta, *En Coatzacoalcos Opera el “Crimen Autorizado*,*”* AVC Noticias, www.avcnoticias.com.mx/bb /verLnota.php?id=150746&secc=66 (Mexican human rights organizations have characterized the Mexican cartels’ relation with immigration officials on their southern border as “authorized crime”); Luciano Campos Garza, *Empresarios de Nuevo León Buscan Armarse Para Encarar al Crimen*, Proceso, Sept. 27, 2013, www.proceso.com.mx/?p=353922. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Elyssa Pachico, *Cold Case: 98 Percent of Mexico’s 2012 Murder Cases Unsolved*, The Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 2013, www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2013/0718/Cold-case-98-percent-of-Mexico-s-2012-murder-cases-unsolved. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Nathan Jones, Blog, James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Oct. 11, 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
11. Claudio Colaguori, *Symbolic Violence and the Violation of Human Rights: Continuing the Sociological Critique of Domination*, International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2010, 388-400 at 390). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
12. Amar Khoday, *Protecting Those Who Go Beyond the Law: Contemplating Refugee Status for Individuals Who Challenge Oppression Through Resistance*, 25 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 571 (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)